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THOUGHTS ON PREEMPTION IN THE
WAKE OF THE LEVINE DECISION
ERIKA FISHER LIETZAN*
SARAH E. PITLYK**
ABSTRACT
On November 16, 2009, one of the authors participated in a panel at the
University of Maryland School of Law on the prospects for preemption doctrine in
the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Wyeth v. Levine.1 This Article repeats
and expands on the views she presented during the panel. Part I describes the
Levine decision. Part II examines the majority's holding as it relates to
impossibility preemption and considers the future of the doctrine in failure-to-warn
suits after Levine. We argue that the announced standard for impossibility
preemption-the clear evidence standard-should be interpreted reasonably and
not in a manner that effectively eviscerates the doctrine. We also describe other
instances of impossibility in the food and drug regulatory context that were not
presented to the Court. Part III considers Levine's obstacle preemption analysis and
its implications for future pharmaceutical tort litigation. We conclude that the
future for obstacle preemption is uncertain, unless FDA conducts rulemaking on
the issue or the Court reconsiders the substantial evidence that state tort litigation
impedes FDA's proper functioning.
I. BACKGROUND: THE LEVINE DECISION
Plaintiff Diana Levine brought failure-to-warn claims against Wyeth for
injuries she suffered after receiving a direct intravenous injection, known as an
"IV-push," of Wyeth's drug Phenergan. 2 The IV-push inadvertently injected
Phenergan into an artery, causing gangrene and eventually requiring amputation of
Levine's hand and forearm. Levine sued Wyeth, alleging that the company had
Copyright © 2010 by Erika Fisher Lietzan and Sarah E. Pitlyk.
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1. 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
2. Id. at 1191-92.
3. Id. at 1191.
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inadequately warned of the risk that an improper IV-push could cause injuries like
those she suffered.4 Wyeth argued that Levine's failure-to-warn claims were
preempted by federal law because FDA had specifically approved Phenergan for
direct IV injection and had approved labeling that warned of its risks.5 The jury
found for Levine, and she received a damages award of $6.7 million. 6 Over the
dissent of its Chief Justice, the Vermont Supreme Court affirmed the jury's
verdict.
7
The Supreme Court ruled, with three justices dissenting,8 that federal law did
not preempt Levine's failure-to-warn claim.9 The majority opinion, authored by
Justice Stevens and joined by four others, rejected two preemption arguments.' I
First, the majority rejected the argument that Levine's state law claims were
preempted because it would be impossible for Wyeth to comply with the state law
requirement in question, FDA's decisions regarding its labeling, and the agency's
rules governing labeling changes ("impossibility" preemption)." Second, the
majority rejected the argument that requiring Wyeth to comply with the state law
requirement in question would interfere with congressional entrustment of new
drug labeling decisions to FDA and, in particular, would stand as an obstacle to
FDA's achievement of its statutory objectives ("obstacle" preemption). 2 We
discuss the majority's reasoning in more detail below. 13
II. LEVINE ON IMPOSSIBILITY PREEMPTION
A. The Doctrine
It is well-settled doctrine that, under the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution,14 state law is preempted "where compliance with both federal and
4. Id. at 1191-92.
5. See id. at 1192-93 (discussing FDA's approval process with regard to Phenergan and its
labeling).
6. Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182-83 (Vt. 2006).
7. Id. at 197.
8. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1217. Justice Alito dissented and was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Scalia. Id.
9. Id. at 1204.
10. Id. at 1190, 1193, 1199. Justice Stevens' opinion was joined by Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer. Id. at 1190. Justice Thomas concurred only in the judgment. Id.
11. Id. at 1196, 1199.
12. Id. at 1199.
13. See infra Part ll.B.
14. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
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state regulations is a physical impossibility .. 15 The doctrine of impossibility
preemption is more often described than applied, however, as the courts have found
that very few factual situations satisfy the standard. 16 It is not enough that state law
prohibits something that federal law permits,17 or vice versa.' 8 In each of these
scenarios, a party could still comply with both laws by refraining from the conduct
in question. In order for a court to find that it is genuinely impossible to comply
with both state and federal law, one body of law must require something that the
other prohibits.19
FDA has long taken the view that its determinations must preempt state
requirements when compliance with both state and federal requirements is
impossible. In the preamble to its 2006 physician labeling rule, which is discussed
in more detail below, the agency identified scenarios in which it would be
"impossible" for drug companies to comply with both FDA requirements and state
law.20 For example, "when [state laws] purport to compel a firm to include in
labeling or advertising a statement that FDA has considered and found
scientifically unsubstantiated," compliance with such laws "would render the drug
misbranded under the act.",2 1 Likewise, when state law "purports to preclude a firm
from including in labeling or advertising a statement that is included in prescription
drug labeling," compliance with the state law would constitute misbranding.22
15. Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963). See also Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287 (1995) (noting preemption "where it is 'impossible for a private
party to comply with both state and federal requirements' (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S.
72, 79 (1990))); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 204 (1983) (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. De La Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982) (same).
16. Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967, 984
n.96 (2002) ("The impossibility standard of implied preemption is often mentioned but rarely applied.");
Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 228 (2000) (calling the impossibility standard
"vanishingly narrow"); Christopher H. Schroeder, Supreme Court Preemption Doctrine, in PREEMPTION
CHOICE: THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM'S CORE QUESTION 119, 131 (William W.
Buzbee ed., 2009) ("There are very few actual case law examples of physical impossibility.").
17. See, e.g., Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996) (finding no
impossibility even where "the Federal Statute authorizes national banks to engage in activities that the
State Statute expressly forbids"); Columbia Plaza Ltd. P'ship v. Cowles, 403 F. Supp. 1337, 1343
(D.D.C. 1975) (holding no impossibility because federal standard is permissive, rather than mandatory).
18. See, e.g., Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n v. Agric. Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461,
477-78 (1984). The Court in Mich. Canners & Freezers Ass'n considered a Michigan law that
"empower[ed] producers' associations to do precisely what the federal Act forbid[] them to do." Id. The
Court noted that "[b]ecause the Michigan Act is cast in permissive rather than mandatory terms ... this
is not a case in which it is impossible for an individual to comply with both state and federal law." Id. at
478 n.21.
19. See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (describing a case of
impossibility as "a case in which state law penalizes what federal law requires").
20. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006).
21. Id.
22. Id.
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Since the 1970s, the Department of Justice has submitted amicus briefs on behalf of
FDA in cases before the federal courts, where the agency concluded on
impossibility grounds that a particular state requirement must give way to
conflicting FDA requirements.
2 3
The courts have largely supported FDA's position. Despite the overall
scarcity of impossibility preemption rulings, there are some findings of
impossibility preemption in the context of food and drug regulation, particularly
23. See, e.g., Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 12-13, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519 (1977) (No. 75-1053), 1976 WL 194685 [hereinafter Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae,
Jones v. Rath Packing Co.] (arguing that California's flour labeling regulations must give way to federal
requirements, where compliance with both is impossible). The Department of Justice also asserted
impossibility preemption in a 1985 Second Circuit case involving cheese labeling requirements.
Memorandum of United States FDA and USDA at 23, Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d
993 (2d Cir. 1985) (No. 83 Civ. 8629) ("New York's per se rule applies to all cheese substitutes
notwithstanding FDA's determination that it may actually be misleading to label a nutritious alternative
food an 'imitation.' Any state law [that] requires a manufacturer or distributor to engage in conduct
violative of Federal law must be deemed preempted." (citations omitted)). And in a 2000 case in the
Southern District of New York involving the labeling of the drug Cardura, the government again
asserted impossibility preemption. Statement of Interest of United States at 11, Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc.,
2000 WL 1738645 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 4042) [hereinafter Statement of Interest of
United States] ("[W]ere the Court to grant plaintiffs' request that changes be made to Cardura's label
and packaging, this would create a direct conflict by requiring a labeling change at odds with the
specific product labeling that was approved by the FDA, even though changes to labels and packaging
must be specifically approved by the FDA."); see also Brief of United States as Amicus Curiae in
Support of Defendants-Appellees at 19-20, Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008) (No.
06-3107) [hereinafter Brief of United States as Amicus in Support of Apotex] ("Mr. Colacicco seeks to
impose liability under state tort law for defendants' alleged failure to provide a warning that had been
specifically rejected by FDA as of October 2003, and accordingly would have constituted unlawful
misbranding had it been included on the labeling for the defendants' drugs. In such circumstances, the
Supremacy Clause bars the imposition of liability under state law."); Arnicus Brief for United States in
Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of District Court's
Order Denying Partial Summary Judgment to Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant at 16, Motus v.
Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 2004) (No. 02-55372) [hereinafter Amicus Brief for United States in
Support of Defendant, Motus v. Pfizer] ("[S]tate law may not require the manufacturer of a drug to warn
of a specific danger that FDA, based on scientific analysis, concludes does not exist. Such a warning
label, one not based on reliable scientific evidence of known risks, would be 'false or misleading', and
thus would misbrand the drug. It is a violation of the [Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA)] to market
a misbranded product." (citations omitted)); Amicus Curiae Brief of United States in Support of
Defendants/Respondents SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare LP, et al. at 27, Dowhal v.
SmithKline Beecham Consumer Health Care LP, 88 P.3d I (Cal. 2004) (No. S109306) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief of United States in Support of SmithKline] ("Accordingly, if Proposition 65 required
[diefendants to use Dowhal's warning labeling, that state law would conflict with.., and must yield to
federal law under the doctrine of conflict preemption."); Corrected Amicus Brief for United States at 25,
Kallas v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 WL 2559710 (D. Utah Sept. 15, 2005) (No. 2:04CV00998) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief for United States, Kallas v. Pfizer] ("Under the Supremacy Clause, a state may not cause a
drug manufacturer to choose either to avoid state tort liability or comply with federal law. Thus, state
law may not validly require the manufacturer of a drug to warn of a specific danger that FDA, based on
the agency's scientific analysis, did not believe to be sufficiently supported to warrant such a warning."
(citations omitted)).
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with respect to labeling.24 For example, the California Supreme Court applied the
doctrine in a case in which FDA and the State of California had mandated different
warnings for a smoking cessation product.25 California state law required all
nicotine delivery products to bear a warning indicating that they contained "a
chemical known to the state of California to cause reproductive harm .... But
FDA "never permitted defendants to use the [state law] warning., 27 Instead, after
an eight-year deliberation about the appropriate pregnancy-related warning for
smoking cessation products, including several exchanges with the defendant
manufacturers, the agency mandated that the products bear a warning that read:
If you are pregnant or breast-feeding, only use this medicine on the
advice of your health care provider. Smoking can seriously harm your
child. Try to stop smoking without using any nicotine replacement
medicine. This medicine is believed to be safer than smoking. However,
28the risks to your child from this medicine are not fully known.
The California Supreme Court found the state warning to be preempted on the
grounds that "[i]f a defendant were to add a warning to its label advising that
nicotine can cause fetal harm, it would violate the FDA's determination and would
risk legal sanctions.
29
B. The Levine Majority's Reasoning
The majority in Levine rejected the legal argument that Wyeth could not
unilaterally add a warning without violating federal law governing misbranding and
unauthorized distribution of unapproved drugs.30 We believe this did not
adequately take into account how FDA actually operates. Under the rules and
24. See, e.g., McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 133-34 (1913) (holding that a state food
labeling statute was preempted because it required a food vendor to remove a label, the removal of
which would render the product misbranded under federal food labeling law); Hurley v. Lederle Labs.
Div. of Am. Cyanamid Co., 863 F.2d 1173, 1179 (5th Cir. 1989) (holding that if a company has
provided all of the requisite information to FDA, the agency's labeling determination would preempt
any conflicting state requirements); Grocery Mfrs. of Am., Inc. v. Gerace, 755 F.2d 993, 1001 (2d Cir.
1985), aff'd, 474 U.S. 801 (1985) (holding that New York's requirements for labeling of imitation
cheese were preempted because "[c]ompliance with both the state and federal requirements [wa]s
impossible"); Lever Bros. Co. v. Maurer, 712 F. Supp. 645, 651 (S.D. Ohio 1989) (invalidating an Ohio
statute prohibiting the use of "butter" in labeling on the grounds that it conflicted with a federal
requirement that ingredients be listed on food labels). See also Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied
Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1113 (2007) (noting that, in
McDermott, "[t]he impossibility of dual compliance required defeat of the state law").
25. Dowhal, 88 P.3d at 4, 9-11.
26. Id. at 4.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 9-11. The court found preemption even though the federal law "contain[s] a savings
clause designed specifically to preserve" California's power to impose a requirement that is "different
from or in addition to, or that is otherwise not identical with, a requirement under" the statute. Id. at 4.
30. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197 (2009).
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norms that govern the industry in its dealings with FDA, it is not realistically
possible for a company to change its package insert without first seeking the
consent of the review division at FDA responsible for approval of the drug in
question.
FDA's oversight of a new drug revolves around that drug's labeling. 31 No
new drug may be marketed without approval of a new drug application (NDA) or
abbreviated NDA.32 In addition to preclinical data, clinical data, and information on
chemical composition and manufacturing methods, among other things, the NDA
must contain proposed labeling. 33 This labeling is the focal point of the submission
because the statute requires the applicant to show that the drug is "safe for use
under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed
labeling" and that there is "substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling .... The exact phrasing of
the labeling evolves during the NDA review and approval process, as the agency
and applicant work together to ensure that the data and labeling align, so that-as
required by statute-the drug, when approved, is both safe and effective when used
as described in the labeling, and the labeling is neither false nor misleading.35
Agency regulations require NDA holders to revise their product labeling
"when new information becomes available that causes the labeling to become
inaccurate, false, or misleading. 36 Every holder of an approved NDA must,
31. The statute defines labeling as "all labels and other written, printed, or graphic matter (1) upon
any article or any of its containers or wrappers, or (2) accompanying such article." 21 U.S.C. § 321(m)
(2006). The Supreme Court has construed labeling broadly to include both documents that are
physically attached to the product and those that are not physically attached but nevertheless
"supplements or explains" the product. E.g., Kordel v. United States, 335 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1948). It
therefore reaches both the professional labeling (package insert), which is submitted in and approved as
part of a new drug application (NDA), and promotional labeling, which by regulation must be consistent
with and not contrary to the approved professional labeling. 21 C.F.R. § 201.100(d)(1) (2009).
32. 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)-(b), (j).
33. Id. § 355(b)(1); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50.
34. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (emphasis added).
35. Id.; see 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (stating that approval of an NDA is "conditioned upon the
applicant incorporating the specified labeling changes exactly as directed").
36. 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a)(2). FDA can also initiate labeling changes itself. Prior to 2007, the
agency largely relied on section 505(e) of the statute. This provision authorizes FDA to initiate
proceedings to withdraw marketing approval for a drug if new evidence shows that the drug is not safe
for use under the conditions of use for which it was approved or if its labeling is false or misleading in
any particular way and was not corrected within a reasonable time. 21 U.S.C. § 355(e). The agency has
sometimes also taken the position that an applicant's failure to amend labeling to take account of new
safety information is an act of misbranding under sections 502(a) and 201(n). This is the position the
agency took in the Selacryn and Oraflex prosecutions in the 1980s. See Factual Basis for the Pleas at
14-17, United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., Nos. 1P85 53 CR, IP85 54 CR (S.D. Ind., Aug. 21, 1985);
Information, passim, United States v. SmithKline Beckman Corp., No. 84-00227 (E.D. Pa. June I,
1981). FDA has also taken this position in the Federal Register notices calling for changes in the
labeling of approved drugs. E.g., Labeling for Oral Hypoglycemic Drugs of the Sulfonylurea Class, 49
[VOL. 13:225
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however, notify FDA about, and in most cases seek approval of, any change in a
condition established in the approved application, beyond those already provided
for in the application.37 Changes fall into three categories: major changes, which
require prior approval; moderate changes, which must be approved by FDA but
may be implemented before the agency has rendered a decision; and minor
changes, which must be reported on an annual basis.38
FDA regulations establish a default requirement of prior approval for a
labeling change.39 Certain editorial changes can be made and described to the
agency in an annual report to the NDA file.40 In addition, certain safety-related
changes can be described in a supplement submitted to the agency
contemporaneously with, or in some cases thirty days prior to, use of the new
labeling.4' Such a "changes being effected" (CBE) supplement is permitted only
when the changes reflect newly acquired information 42 and where there is sufficient
evidence of causation.43
Fed. Reg. 14,303, 14,306-07 (April 11, 1984). Distribution of a misbranded drug can lead to product
seizure, an injunction, and even criminal penalties. Id. §§ 332, 333, 334, 352. Section 505(o)(4) of the
FDCA, added in 2007, gave FDA significant new authority to require labeling changes. Id. § 355(o)
(West Supp. 2009). Violation of a labeling change order issued pursuant to section 505(o)(4) is a federal
crime and can lead to substantial civil money penalties. Id. § 333 (2006).
37. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(a)(1).
38. Id. § 314.70(b)-(d). These rules govern any changes to the conditions established in an
approved application, not just changes to the approved labeling. Id.
39. See id. § 314.70(b)(2)(v) (requiring prior approval for labeling changes, with three exceptions,
found in 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii), (d)(2)(ix), and (d)(2)(x)).
40. E.g., id. § 314.70(d)(2)(ix)-(x).
41. Id. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii). The regulation permitting changes to the labeling of a new drug to be
made without prior approval by the agency does not have a corresponding statutory provision. Cf 21
U.S.C. § 356a(d)(3)(B)(ii) (authorizing FDA to designate a category of non-major manufacturing
changes for which distribution of the drug may commence upon submission of a supplemental
application). It is the descendant of a 1965 policy in which FDA announced it would "take no action"
against a company if certain safety-related labeling changes were implemented prior to receipt of formal
FDA approval. Supplemental New-Drug Applications, 30 Fed. Reg. 993, 994 (Jan. 30, 1965); see also
New Drug and Antibiotic Regulations, 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7454 (Feb. 22, 1985) (reasserting the rule that
some labeling changes may be implemented without prior FDA approval).
42. 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii); see also id. § 314.3(b) (defining newly acquired information as
"data, analyses, or other information not previously submitted to the agency"); New Drug and Antibiotic
Regulations, 47 Fed. Reg. 46,622, 46,623 (Oct. 19, 1982) (stating that the regulation only applies "to
correct concerns about newly discovered risks from the use of a drug").
43. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 2,848, 2,848 (Jan. 16, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314,
601, and 814) ("[FDA's] longstanding position [is] that a supplemental application.., is appropriate to
amend the labeling ... to add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction
only if there is sufficient evidence of a causal association with the drug ...."); Supplemental
Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics, and Medical Devices, 73
Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,603, 49,608 (Aug. 22, 2008) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 314, 601, and 814)
("[A] supplemental application ... is appropriate to amend the labeling .. .to add or strengthen a
contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse reaction if there is sufficient evidence of a causal
association .... FDA does not consider this to be a substantive policy change, and it does not alter the
2010]
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The Levine majority made short shrift of Wyeth's impossibility argument on
the ground that the CBE regulation would have allowed it to make the change
sought by Levine without prior FDA approval. Although the decision called
Wyeth's reading of the regulation "cramped,' 44 the majority itself took a cramped
and unrealistic view of the legal and practical situation facing regulated industry.
Regardless of the mechanism used, the process is the same. Following a
manufacturer's submission of a supplement proposing a labeling change, FDA
evaluates the scientific evidence pertaining to the proposed change and determines
for itself "whether the proposed labeling change is appropriate based on such
factors as the frequency of the risk of a side-effect/adverse outcome, the severity of
the potential risks, and the potential benefits and risks associated with the proposed
warning."45 "If the agency disapproves the proposed change[], the manufacturer
may not use the unapproved labeling. ' ' 6 Indeed, if the company marketed the
product using the disapproved labeling, it would violate the prohibition against
marketing an unapproved new drug and/or against marketing a misbranded drug.47
Accordingly, while the CBE process provides a theoretical means by which
manufacturers are permitted to add warnings to their labeling without prior
"approval" from FDA, a company typically seeks consent from the relevant review
division prior to submission of the formal CBE supplement. This practice is
industry-wide and explicitly acknowledged by FDA.48 The fact that it is not
agency's current practices with respect to accepting or rejecting labeling changes proposed by a CBE
supplement.").
44. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1197 (2009).
45. Amicus Brief of United States in Support of SmithKline, supra note 23, at 10.
46. Amicus Brief for United States, Kallas v. Pfizer, supra note 23, at 9.
47. 21 U.S.C. §§ 352(a), 352(f), 355(a)-(b) (2006 & West Supp. 2009); see also Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 201, 314, and 601) (noting that inclusion of
"a statement that FDA has considered and found [to be] scientifically unsubstantiated... would render
the drug misbranded"); Brief for Respondent at 35-36, Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL
3285388 (acknowledging that certain changes to the labeling would render a product a "new drug");
Amicus Brief for United States in Support of Defendant, Motus v. Pfizer, supra note 23, at 17 (noting
that a proposed warning "would have misbranded the product because the warning would not have been
supported by science"); Statement of Interest of United States, supra note 23, at 14 (warning that, if the
court were to mandate labeling changes that FDA determined were not supported by the evidence, the
drug would be deemed misbranded).
48. FDA has stated that:
While a sponsor is permitted to add risk information to the [full package insert] without first
obtaining FDA approval via a CBE supplement, FDA reviews all such submissions and may
later deny approval of the supplement, and the labeling remains subject to enforcement action
if the added information makes the labeling false or misleading under section 502(a) of the
act. Thus, in practice, manufacturers typically consult with FDA prior to adding risk
information to labeling.
Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934 (citations omitted). As explained twenty years earlier by a former Chief
Counsel of the agency, because manufacturers must obtain FDA's approval after the fact, "the actual
[VOL. 13:225
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embodied in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) or an FDA
regulation does not make it any less of a "rule" from a real world perspective, and it
should have been treated as such by the Levine majority.
After rejecting Wyeth's argument that it was not legally possible to change its
labeling unilaterally, the majority looked for "clear evidence" in the record that
FDA would not have approved a change to Phenergan's package insert.49 Its
judgment that there was no such evidence must be understood within the confines
of its description of the factual record. According to the majority, in the seventeen
years after Wyeth submitted a supplemental NDA regarding the risks of IV-push,
the company and FDA corresponded only "intermittently" about the labeling. 50 It
did acknowledge that, in 1987 and 1988, "FDA suggested different warnings
about" the risk of IV-push, Wyeth submitted labeling incorporating the proposed
changes, and FDA failed to respond to the proposal. 5' But it disregarded that
exchange because Wyeth's proposed changes "did not differ in any material respect
from the FDA-approved warning," and "FDA viewed the change as non-
substantive .... Apart from this single exchange, the only facts cited by the
majority were that Wyeth did not propose the warning deemed appropriate by the
Vermont jury,5 and that Wyeth did not supply FDA with "an evaluation or analysis
concerning the specific dangers posed by the IV-push method., 54 The majority
appears to have ignored many facts that the dissent regarded as relevant to the issue
of whether FDA would have approved a labeling change,55 relying instead on the
factual determinations of the lower courts. 6
C. Impossibility Preemption After Levine
There are two open issues with respect to impossibility preemption in the new
drug labeling context: the application of the clear evidence standard,57 and the
operation of the impossibility doctrine when a CBE supplement is not legally
permitted.5 8
freedom of manufacturers unilaterally to change the package insert is minimal." Richard M. Cooper,
Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 233, 236 (1986).
49. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
50. Id. at 1192.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1198 n.5.
53. Id. at 1198.
54. Id. at 1199.
55. See id. at 1222-26 (Alito, J., dissenting).
56. Id. at 1198-99 (majority opinion).
57. See infra Part II.C. 1.
58. See infra Part II.C.2.
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1. The Clear Evidence Standard
Although the Levine decision requires "clear evidence that the FDA would
not have approved a change" as a prerequisite to a finding of impossibility
preemption,59 it specifies only one set of circumstances that does not constitute
clear evidence. What satisfies the standard must now be fleshed out in the lower
courts. Important policy considerations support a reasonable interpretation of clear
evidence in the context of FDA's review of prescription drug labeling. For
example, it would be impossible for a defendant to show that FDA actually rejected
the precise language proposed by the plaintiff on the basis of precisely the same
information and arguments as opposed to, for example, a single subsequent
postmarket safety report or a new meta-analysis of previously submitted data.6 ° The
Levine decision cannot be read to require a showing that is impossible to make.
Nor, as a policy matter, should it be read to require industry to inundate the agency
with labeling change submissions, which a "precise wording" or an "actual
rejection" approach could prompt. In fact, the decision itself suggests a more
reasonable approach. The standard is not that FDA did not approve the change; it is
that FDA would not have approved a change. Under this standard, it might be
relevant, or even sufficient, that the agency considered and rejected (whether
proposed by the manufacturer or on its own initiative) inclusion of the relevant risk
information-with any wording-in the package insert. It might also be relevant, or
even sufficient, that the agency did not require a safety labeling change, for
example under section 505(o)(4) of the FDCA, when faced with evidence that is
not qualitatively different from the evidence on which the plaintiff relies.6'
Two interesting test cases for the clear evidence standard are currently
pending before district courts in the Tenth Circuit.62 The plaintiffs in the cases have
argued that the labeling of two antidepressants, Paxil and Effexor, should have
59. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1198.
60. This would require manufacturers to imagine and propose every conceivable variation in
wording when submitting labeling changes. Moreover, safety reports are submitted to the agency on a
rolling basis, and stakeholders (companies, the agency, insurers, and the scientific community) analyze
and reanalyze safety information continually. See generally Jill D. Jacobson & David Feigal, Red Sky in
the Morning: Modifying Prescription Drug Labels as a Result of Postmarket Surveillance, 62 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 529, 531-32 (2007) (outlining the postmarket safety reporting procedures and FDA's
evaluation of those reports). Thus, it will always be possible to point to some subsequent "information"
that was not before the agency decisionmaker when it considered the precise wording that plaintiffs
demand.
61. 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (West Supp. 2009) (requiring the agency to initiate a safety labeling
change when it becomes aware of new safety information on the basis of which it believes a change
should be made).
62. Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., No. 08-6018, 2010 WL 2179290, at *1 (10th Cir. June 2, 2010),
vacating and remanding Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (W.D. Okla. 2008); Miller v.
SmithKline Beecham Corp., Nos. 08-5042, 08-5050, 2010 WL 2180615, at *1 (10th Cit. June 2, 2010),
vacating and remanding Miller v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 03-CV-393-GKF-FHM, 2008 WL
510449 (N.D. Okla. Feb. 15, 2008).
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included warnings about suicidality in adults in 1998 and 2002, respectively. 63
Before Levine, both district courts held that the plaintiffs' claims were preempted,
but Levine was handed down while the appeals were pending, prompting the Tenth
Circuit to remand the cases for reconsideration in light of the new clear evidence
standard. 4
The facts in these cases appear to provide compelling support for satisfaction
of the clear evidence standard. As the defendants have pointed out, FDA has been
examining the issue of suicidality and antidepressants for nearly two decades and
has consistently rejected the argument that antidepressants should bear a warning
about adult suicidality. 65 In addition to the safety information that the agency
collected pursuant to its clinical trial safety reporting, postmarket reporting, and
annual report regulations66 and the voluminous scientific literature addressing the
issue,67 FDA also received a number of citizen petitions asserting that labeling
changes or product withdrawal were necessary on account of suicide risk.68
63. E.g., Complaint at 3, Miller, 2008 WL 510449 (No. 03-CV-393-GKF-FHM), 2003 WL
24063926; Complaint at 5-6, Dobbs, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1275 (No. CIV-04-1762-D), 2004 WL 3139491.
64. See Dobbs, 530 F. Supp. 2d at 1291 (holding that the plaintiff's "claims are preempted by the
applicable FDA regulations governing labeling of prescription drugs"), vacated and remanded by
Dobbs, 2010 WL 2179290, at *1; Miller, 2008 WL 510449, at 1 (granting summary judgment on
grounds of conflict preemption), vacated and remanded by Miller, 2010 WL 2180615, at * 1.
65. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee/Cross-Appellant at 41-45, Miller v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., Nos. 08-5042, 08-5050 (10th Cir. Sept. 1, 2009); Brief for Defendant-Appellee Wyeth at 54-60,
Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., No. 08-6018 (10th Cir. July 16, 2009); see also infra notes 66-77 and
accompanying text. But see Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 396 (7th Cir. 2010)
(holding that the regulatory history did not constitute clear evidence as to young adult suicidality).
66. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 312.32(c), 314.80(c), 314.81(b) (2009) (requiring the submission of safety
information and reports).
67. E.g., W. Creaney et al., Antidepressant Induced Suicidal Ideation, 6 HUM.
PSYCHOPHARMACOLOGY 329, 329-31 (1991) (outlining a study of two patients on antidepressants and
concluding that "the emergence of suicidal ideation on antidepressants cannot always be attributed to a
lifting of psychomotor retardation but rather that the ideas may in some instances be produced by
antidepressants"); Robert A. King et al., Emergence of Self-Destructive Phenomena in Children and
Adolescents During Fluoxetine Treatment, 30 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 179,
183 (1991) (describing how a sample of children and adolescents developed self-injurious behavior
during fluoxetine treatment); Prakash Masand et al., Letter to the Editor, Suicidal Ideation Related to
Fluoxetine Treatment, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 420, 420 (1991) (reporting two cases in which a strong
association between suicidal ideation and fluoxetine treatment existed); Anthony J. Rothschild & Carol
A. Locke, Reexposure to Fluoxetine After Serious Suicide Attempts by Three Patients: The Role of
Akathisia, 52 J. CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 491, 491-92 (1991) (outlining a study where patients were re-
exposed to fluoxetine and developed severe akathisia, and stating that a previous suicide attempt while
on fluoxetine was also precipitated by akathisia); Martin H. Teicher et al., Emergence of Intense Suicidal
Preoccupation During Fluoxetine Treatment, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 207, 207-09 (1990) (presenting
several case studies in which patients felt "intense self-destructive thoughts" as a result of fluoxetine
treatment).
68. See Citizen Petition of Sidney M. Wolfe & Ida Hellander, Health Research Group, Public
Citizen, FDA Dkt. No. 91P-0203 (May 23, 1991) (providing extensive documentation in support of a
boxed warning on suicidality in Prozac labeling); Citizen Petition of Sanford Block, Citizens Comm'r
on Human Rights, FDA Dkt. No. 90P-0342 (Oct. 11, 1990) (requesting that the agency withdraw its
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Moreover, the agency requested supplemental reports from the manufacturers,69
and on at least six different occasions between 1990 and 2006 it convened advisory
committees to review questions relating to modem antidepressant safety. 70 Having
thus examined the potential link between suicide and antidepressants, both
individually and as a class, the agency has never judged adult suicide warnings to
be appropriate. To this day it has not adopted a suicide warning for adults over the
age of 25.7' Instead, FDA has denied the citizen petitions requesting withdrawal or
labeling changes based on suicidality. 72 It has directed the manufacturers to avoid
labeling changes and to use class (rather than product-specific) labeling.73
Furthermore, the agency has repeatedly communicated its views on modem
approval of Prozac); Citizen Petition of Rosellen Meysenburg, FDA Dkt. No. 97P-0010 (Jan. 2, 1997)
(requesting revision of the Prozac labeling to include a specific warning concerning suicide).
69. See, e.g., Brief of the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Appellee at 17, Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., No. 08-6018, 2009 WL 2429125 (10th
Cir. July 24, 2009) ("FDA has also asked Wyeth to provide a report on its data, which FDA has then
independently analyzed in conjunction with data from other . . . manufacturers [of similar drugs].")
(citing Letter from FDA to Wyeth (July 22, 2003)).
70. Transcript of Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee at 30 (Nov. 19, 1990);
Transcript of Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee at 12 (Sept. 20, 1991), available at
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/AC/prozac/2443T .PDF; Transcript of
Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory Committee at 51 (Apr. 30, 1993); Transcript of
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee with the Pediatric Subcommitteeof the Anti-Infective
Drugs Advisory Committee at 12-14 (Feb. 2, 2004), available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/
dockets/ac/04/transcripts/4006Tl .pdf; Transcript of Joint Meeting of the CDER Psychopharmacologic
Drugs Advisory Committee and the FDA Pediatric Advisory Committee at 6, 16 (Sept. 13, 2004),
available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrns/dockets/ac/04/transcripts/2004-4065TI.pdf; Transcript of
Psychopharmacologic Drugs Advisory Committee at 7 (Dec. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4272tl 
-part I.pdf.
71. In 2007, FDA adopted a warning about suicide risk for young adults, age 24 and younger,
adding that the data did not show an increased risk in adults older than 24. Food & Drug Admin., New
Warnings Proposed for Antidepressants (May 3, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
ConsumerUpdates/ucm048950.htn.
72. See Response to Citizen Petition of Sanford Block, Citizens Comm'r on Human Rights, FDA
Dkt. No. 90P-0342 (July 26, 1991) (denying request that the agency withdraw its approval of Prozac and
reviewing the scientific basis for the decision); Response to Citizen Petition of Sidney M. Wolfe & Ida
Hellander, Health Research Group, Public Citizen, FDA Dkt. No. 91P-0203 (June 3, 1992) (denying
request that FDA revise Prozac's labeling to include a boxed warning related to its association with
suicidality and citing the unanimous conclusion of the Psychopharmacological Drugs Advisory
Committee that "the evidence was not sufficient to show that antidepressants in general, or Prozac in
particular, cause the emergence and/or intensification of suicidality and/or other violent behavior");
Response to Citizen Petition of Rosellen Meysenburg, FDA Dkt. No. 97P-0010 (June 25, 1997)
(enclosing the response to the citizen petition from Public Citizen).
73. See, e.g., Letter from Russell Katz, Dir., Div. of Neuropharmacological Drug Prods., Ctr. for
Drug Evaluation & Research, Food & Drug Admin., to Kenneth Bonk, Dir., Worldwide Regulatory
Affairs, Wyeth Pharm., Inc. (May 13, 2004), available at http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda-docs/appletter/2004/20151slr028,030,032,20699slrO41,048,0521tr.pdf (noting an agreement
to not change the label and to maintain current warning language).
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antidepressants and suicide risk to the public through a Talk Paper74 and at least
five Public Health Advisories." Thus, the defendants appear to have a strong
argument that FDA has judged adult suicide warnings to be scientifically
unfounded and would therefore have rejected them in 1998 and 2002.
Still, it is possible that even such an extensive and well-documented history of
agency consideration will fail to constitute clear evidence under certain
interpretations of Levine. In fact, the Seventh Circuit recently held that the agency's
history of studying the issue of suicidality and antidepressants does not constitute
clear evidence that it would have rejected a warning related to suicidality in young
adults.76 It remains to be seen whether the Tenth Circuit will draw the same
conclusion with respect to suicidality in adults.77
74. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Talk Paper: FDA Statement Regarding the Anti-Depressant Paxil
for Pediatric Population (June 19, 2003), http://web.archive.org/web/20031003215653/www.fda.gov/
bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2003/ANS01230.html.
75. Press Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Proposes New Warnings About Suicidal Thinking,
Behavior in Young Adults Who Take Antidepressant Medications (May 2, 2007),
http://www.fda.govNewsEventsNewsroomPressAnnouncements/2007/ucm108905.htm; Food & Drug
Admin., Public Health Advisory: Suicidality in Adults Being Treated with Antidepressant Medications
(June 3, 2005), http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucm053169.htm; Food &
Drug Admin., Reports of Suicidality in Pediatric Patients Being Treated with Antidepressant
Medications for Major Depressive Disorder (MDD) (Oct. 27, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucml68828.htm; Food & Drug Admin.,
Suicidality in Children and Adolescents Being Treated with Antidepressant Medications (Oct. 15, 2004),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucml61679.htm; Food & Drug Admin.,
Worsening Depression and Suicidality in Patients Being Treated with Antidepressants (Mar. 22, 2004),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DrugSafety/PublicHealthAdvisories/ucml 61696.htm.
76. See Mason v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 596 F.3d 387, 396 (7th Cir. 2010) (holding that
plaintiffs' claims are not preempted because the defendant "did not meet its burden of demonstrating by
clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected a label change warning about the risk of suicide by
young adults").
77. There is one-arguably significant-difference between the facts in Mason and those in the
Tenth Circuit cases: FDA eventually required drugs such as Prozac (generally known as selective
serotonin reuptake inhibitors or SSRIs) to bear a warning related to suicidality in young adults, whereas
it still has not required any such warning as to adult suicidality. See supra note 71. In Mason, the court
noted that:
[I]n May of 2007, the FDA ordered all antidepressant manufacturers to include an additional
warning about the increased likelihood of suicidality in young adults under the age of 24....
Since these events occurred well after [plaintiffl's suicide [in 2003], they are not persuasive
in determining whether there was clear evidence that the FDA would have rejected the
proposed warning at the time of... death. To the extent these subsequent events have any
sway, however, they clearly cut towards making it less likely that the FDA would have
rejected the plaintiffs'proposed warning in 2003.
Mason, 596 F.3d at 395-96 (emphasis added). Thus, the Tenth Circuit could judge that there is stronger
evidence-namely, the agency's continued refusal to require such a warning, even after doing so for
other patient populations-that FDA would have rejected an adult suicide warning. At least one of the
lower courts appears to have given weight to that fact. See Dobbs v. Wyeth Pharm., 530 F. Supp. 2d
1275, 1289-90 & n,6 (W.D. Okla. 2008) (noting that FDA had not only considered and rejected an adult
suicidality warning at the time of the plaintiffs suicide, but that it still had not required such a warning
at the time of the decision). Because the significance of such subsequent regulatory developments is
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2. Limited Use of the CBE Supplement
Even if the CBE mechanism was theoretically available in the Levine case,
there are situations in which a CBE supplement is not legally permitted. Each of
these situations should give rise to impossibility preemption. To begin with, some
safety-related changes to the labeling do not qualify for use of the CBE mechanism
by the plain terms of 21 C.F.R. § 314.70 because the evidence is not newly
acquired or because there is insufficient evidence of causation.78 FDA's regulatory
scheme precludes use of the CBE in other situations as well. For example, FDA
regulations require submission of a prior approval supplement for any change to the
Highlights information, except for certain minor changes. 79 Important safety
changes to prescribing information-for example, substantive changes to the boxed
warnings, contraindications, or warnings and precautions sections of the package
insert-must also be reflected in the Highlights section. 80 Thus, for those drugs to
which the new rules apply, 8 1 the addition of major new safety information will
require prior approval, since the corresponding changes to the Highlights section
cannot legally take the form of a CBE supplement. Changes to an approved
Medication Guide (MedGuide) also require prior approval, and any MedGuide
must be consistent with the approved professional labeling.82 Where the addition of
debatable, if the Tenth Circuit decision does find clear evidence that FDA would have rejected an adult
suicide warning, where the Seventh Circuit did not find clear evidence as to young adult suicidality, the
circuit split could provide an opportunity for the Supreme Court to revisit and elucidate Levine's clear
evidence standard.
78. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (2009) (outlining the circumstances in which a CBE
supplement may be used).
79. Id. §§ 314.70(b)(2)(v)(C), (c)(6)(iii), 601.12(f)(1), (f)(2)(i). Given the importance of the
Highlights section and the difficulty in summarizing the information in the Full Prescribing
Information, the agency concluded that it was "essential for FDA to review and approve most proposed
changes to the information in Highlights." Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3932 (Jan. 24, 2006). FDA has authority
to waive the prior approval requirement under 21 C.F.R. § 314.90.
80. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(5). The changes that must be included in Highlights are "those changes
that are significant to the clinical use of the drug and, therefore, have significant clinical implications for
practitioners (i.e., substantive changes)." Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3938. As one FDA official has explained,
this requirement means that "probably all important safety changes will now result in a change to
Highlights." Brian Marson, Labeling Rule Requires Sponsors to Start Safety Discussions with FDA
Earlier, THE PINK SHEET, Oct. 29, 2007, at 26 (quoting Laurie Burke, CDER study endpoints and
labeling team leader, during a Drug Information Association call).
81. The new labeling regulations apply only to prescription drug products for which an NDA,
biologics license application (BLA), or efficacy supplement was approved after June 30, 2001.
21 C.F.R. § 201.56(b)(1). The manufacturers of these products must modify the drug's labeling to meet
the requirements of new regulations, which are phased in through 2013 based on the approval date of the
application. Id. § 201.56(c). Manufacturers of other products may voluntarily adopt the new labeling
requirements at any time. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3928.
82. 21 C.F.R. § 208.20(a)(2). A MedGuide is required for any drug products "that the [agency]
determines pose a serious and significant public health concern requiring distribution of FDA-approved
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significant new safety information to the professional labeling of a product requires
a corresponding change to its MedGuide, the change to the professional labeling
will effectively be subject to prior approval.83
Another series of cases has raised a novel variation on the impossibility
question in Levine. The question presented is whether state failure-to-warn claims
against generic manufacturers are preempted because of the federal statutory
requirement that the labeling of a generic drug be identical to that of the reference
listed product on which it is based.84 FDA has taken the position that impossibility
preemption applies, because generic manufacturers may not revise their labeling
unilaterally.85 The agency's own statement that generic manufacturers may not
revise their labeling to vary from that of the innovator 86 strikes us as "clear
evidence" that FDA would reject the labeling changes demanded by the plaintiffs.
But the lower court rulings are mixed, with a (slight) majority rejecting
patient information." Id. § 208.1(a). The agency requires a MedGuide when it determines that the
MedGuide is necessary to permit patients to use the drug product safely and effectively. Id. § 208.1 (b);
see also id. § 208. 1(c) (requiring a MedGuide when (1) a MedGuide "could help prevent serious adverse
effects;" (2) the drug has serious risks that "could affect patients' decision to use ... the product;" or (3)
"adherence to directions for use is crucial to the drug's effectiveness"). FDA approves the content of all
MedGuides.
83. Id. § 314.70(b)(v)(B). Similar reasoning applies with respect to the labeling of a drug with an
approved Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategy (REMS). By statute, changes to the REMS require
prior approval. 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(h)(3), (h)(5)(H) (West Supp. 2009). Some elements of a REMS
constitute labeling and must therefore, under FDA regulations, be consistent with and not contrary to the
approved professional labeling. Some safety-related labeling changes will require coordinated changes
to the REMS on account of the consistency rule. These labeling changes will therefore require prior
approval. See Supplemental Applications Proposing Labeling Changes for Approved Drugs, Biologics,
and Medical Devices, 73 Fed. Reg. 49,603, 49,607 (Aug. 22, 2008) ("[l]f the labeling for a drug
describes an element of an approved REMS, the sponsor must receive prior approval of any labeling
change that would necessitate a change to the sponsor's REMS.").
84. See, e.g., Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 279, 281 (D. N.H. 2009) (stating the
question presented as "whether state-law tort claims alleging the defective labeling of generic drugs are
preempted by federal law"); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 612 F. Supp. 2d 437, 438-39, 442 (D. Vt. 2009)
(considering the question of whether generic manufacturers are subject to Levine for the purposes of an
interlocutory appeal and motion to stay proceedings against the generic manufacturers).
85. Brief of United States as Amicus in Support of Apotex, supra note 23, at 7-8 & n.4 (arguing
that the manufacturer of generic paroxetine hydrochloride should not be liable for failure to warn
because generic drug manufacturers are required to maintain the same labeling as their name brand
counterparts; may not make labeling changes without getting prior FDA approval; and, in particular, are
not eligible to use the CBE process). The Third Circuit found preemption in Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc.,
521 F.3d 253, 271 (3d Cir. 2008), but the decision was vacated and remanded for further consideration
in light of Levine. Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578, 1578-79 (2009). FDA then withdrew as
an amicus, declining to take a position on reconsideration because it had not yet adequately examined
the implications of Levine. Letter from Sharon Swingle, Attorney, Civil Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Marcia M. Waldron, Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit (Apr. 28, 2009).
86. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(G) (2006) (showing that an abbreviated new drug application
(ANDA) may not be approved if the labeling is different, with certain narrow exceptions not including
safety information); 21 C.F.R. § 314.94(a)(8)(iv) (listing variations permitted in generic drug labeling);
id. § 314.127(a)(7) (describing labeling differences that require disapproval of ANDA).
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impossibility preemption. 7 Only two circuit courts have rendered decisions, both
88holding that the state law was not preempted by FDA regulations.
III. LEVINE ON OBSTACLE PREEMPTION
A. The Doctrine
The doctrine of "obstacle preemption" is usually attributed to Hines v.
Davidovitz,89 in which the Supreme Court considered whether Pennsylvania's alien
registration requirements were preempted by a recently enacted national scheme. 90
Although there was no express preemption provision in the federal statute and
compliance with the two regimes was not impossible, the Court nevertheless found
the Pennsylvania requirements preempted on the grounds that they would "stand[]
as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives of Congress."9t
The Hines Court observed that "there can be no one crystal clear distinctly
marked formula" for this kind of preemption.92 The Court rested its conclusion that
Pennsylvania's requirements posed an obstacle to the federal regime on the
traditional role of the federal government in matters of foreign affairs, 93 the breadth
and comprehensiveness of Congress's plan,94 and evidence in the legislative history
that Congress had sought to "steer a middle path" between security and personal
87. Compare, e.g., Dorsett v. Sandoz Inc., 2010 WL 1174204 at *19 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2010)
(declining to find preemption); Bartlett, 659 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (same); Kellogg, 612 F. Supp. 2d at 442
(same); Stacel v. Teva Pharm., USA, 620 F. Supp. 2d 899, 907 (ND. II1. 2009) (same); Schrock v.
Wyeth, Inc., 601 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1265 (W.D. Okla. 2009) (same), with Gaeta v. Perrigo Pharm. Co.,
No. C 05-04115 JW, 2009 WL 4250690, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009) (denying plaintiffs' motion for
reconsideration on preemption); Masterson v. Apotex, Corp., No. 07-61665-CIV, 2008 WL 3262690, at
*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2008) (finding preemption); Morris v. Wyeth, No. 1:07-CV-176-R, 2009 WL
736200, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2009), affg 582 F. Supp. 2d 861, 868 (W.D. Ky. 2008) (same); Smith
v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 5:07-CV-18-R, 2009 WL 736208, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2009), affg 2009 WL
425032, at *4, *7 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 20, 2009) (same); Wilson v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 3:07-CV-00378-R, 2009
WL 736198, at *1 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 4, 2009), affg 2008 WL 4696995, at *6 (W.D. Ky. Oct. 24, 2008)
(same).
88. Mensing v. Wyeth, Inc., 588 F.3d 603, 608 (8th Cir. 2009); Demahy v. Actavis, Inc., 593 F.3d.
428, 449 (5th Cir. 2010). At this writing, appeals on the issue are pending before the Sixth Circuit. See
Appellant Lala Smith's Opening Brief at 1, Smith v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-5460 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 2009),
2009 WL 4611244 (presenting the question "[w]hether the district court erred in holding that the FDCA
preempts... claims for personal injuries caused by generic a [sic] drug manufacturer failure to warn" on
appeal to the Sixth Circuit); Appellant Alice Wilson's Opening Brief at I, Wilson v. Pliva, Inc., No. 09-
5466 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 2009), 2009 WL 4611245 (same); Appellant Dennis Morris's Opening Brief at 1,
Morris v. Wyeth, Inc., No. 09-5509 (6th Cir. Dec. 1, 2009), 2009 WL 4611243 (same).
89. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
90. Id. at 59-60.
91. Id. at 67, 74.
92. Id. at 67.
93. Id. at 62-63.
94. Id. at 69.
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liberty.95 Subsequent courts have invoked similar themes in their obstacle
preemption analyses by focusing on the character of the subject matter (i.e.,
whether it is traditionally a federal matter or particularly requires uniformity), 96 the
purposes of the federal law, 9 7 and whether the federal scheme effects a balance or
compromise between competing objectives.9 8
FDA has repeatedly pointed to the relevance of these considerations in the
drug regulatory context. In briefs filed by the government on FDA's behalf in
Levine and many other cases over the last three decades, the agency has
emphasized that regulating prescription drugs is a federal responsibility, requiring
the agency to exercise exclusive control in order to provide uniform information to
the public. 99 The agency has also repeatedly invoked the purposes of the FDCA,
such as to provide for complex regulatory decisions to be made by experts based on
a wide range of viewpoints.100 In addition, the agency has consistently described its
95. Id. at 73-74.
96. See, e.g., United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (declining to apply a presumption
against preemption of state law "when the State regulates in an area where there has been a history of
significant federal presence" and observing that the federal statutory scheme "has as one of its objectives
a uniformity of regulation for maritime commerce" ); Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504
(1988) (noting that in areas involving "unique federal interests," the Court is more likely to find that a
state law is preempted); Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143-44 (1963)
(considering whether "the nature of the subject matter" requires that the state law give way to the federal
by examining whether it is a "subject by its very nature admitting only of national supervision" or a
"subject demanding exclusive federal regulation in order to achieve uniformity vital to national
interests").
97. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374-77 (2000) (examining
Congress's objectives in enacting the federal statute granting the President control over diplomatic
relations with Burma); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 875-81 (2000) (enumerating
various purposes served by a passive restraint regulation).
98. See, e.g., Int'l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494-97 (1987) (finding preemption of a
state law that "upset[] the balance of public and private interests so carefully addressed" by the federal
statute and thereby potentially undermined "Congress' considered judgment as to the best method of
serving the public interest and reconciling ... often competing concerns"); Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986) (finding obstacle preemption when the federal statute represented
"a carefully drawn balance between the purposes of warning the public of the hazards of cigarette
smoking and protecting the interests of national economy").
99. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 9, 11, 13-14, Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249), 2008 WL 2308908 [hereinafter Amicus Brief Supporting
Wyeth] (describing FDA's expertise and authority in providing uniform information to the public); see
also Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 18, Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001) (No. 98-1768), 2000 WL 1364441 [hereinafter Amicus Brief
Supporting Buckman Co.] ("[T]he field involving an individual's obligation to provide accurate
information to a federal regulatory agency is one in which there is an overriding and longstanding
federal interest."); Statement of Interest of United States at 1-2, 5, Bernhardt v. Pfizer, Inc., 2000 WL
1738645 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 4042) (observing that "the Federal Government, through the
FDA, is responsible for regulating prescription drugs," and stressing that the success of the agency's
mission to protect the public health depends on its ability to exercise "exclusive control over ... drug
labeling" and thereby "ensure that the public receives uniform, consistent information").
100. See, e.g., Amicus Brief Supporting Buckman Co., supra note 99, at 21 ("The FDCA establishes
a comprehensive scheme to regulate the information that an entity must submit to FDA .... "); Brief of
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mandate as one of careful balancing of the competing considerations of promoting
safety while not discouraging beneficial use.'0 On these grounds, FDA has argued
that permitting state juries to impose alternative requirements on drug companies
would undermine Congress' objectives in establishing the agency and "frustrate the
agency's implementation of its statutory mandate."' 0 2 Among other concerns, the
agency has pointed out that the prospect of such liability encourages drug
manufacturers to include warnings about "speculative risks" (i.e., to
United States at 6, In re Paxil Litigation, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24621 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2002) (No.
CV 01-07937), 2002 U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 10378 ("In enacting the FDCA, Congress clearly
desired that the full range of scientific and medical opinion be brought to bear on the question of
publicly available prescription drug information." (citing 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(4) (2006))); Statement of
Interest of United States, supra note 99, at 10 ("Consultation with a full range of experts, as well as
cooperation with all those affected, is what the FDA does and is precisely what Congress desired."
(citing 21 U.S.C. § 393(b)(4))); Amicus Brief of United States in Support of SmithKline, supra note 23,
at 31 ("[B]y enacting the FDCA, Congress established a comprehensive regulatory plan designed to
ensure the safety and effectiveness of drugs. Congress gave FDA plenary authority to regulate the
labeling of drug products.").
101. See, e.g., Amicus Brief Supporting Wyeth, supra note 99, at 10-11 (explaining that "labeling
must strike a balance between notifying users of potential dangers and not unnecessarily deterring
beneficial uses" through overwaming); Statement Regarding the Demonstrations of Effectiveness of
Human Drug Products and Devices, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,180, 39,180 (Aug. 1, 1995) ("In evaluating the
safety of a new drug or medical device, FDA weighs the product's demonstrated effectiveness against its
risks to determine whether the benefits outweigh the risks. This weighing process also takes into account
information such as the seriousness and outcome of the disease, the presence and adequacy of existing
treatments, and adverse reaction and other safety data."); Prescription Drug Products; Revocation of
Patient Package Insert Requirements, 47 Fed. Reg. 39,147, 39,149 (Sep. 7, 1982) ("[A]s part of the
approval process to which virtually all prescription drugs are subject, risks are weighed against potential
benefits, and not considered as absolutes. Patient information that is heavily 'warning' oriented,
therefore, might undermine the more balanced approach to informing patients about drug therapy ....").
102. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3934 (Jan. 24, 2006); see also 150 CONG. REC. S8657 (daily ed. July 22,
2004) (Letter from Peter Barton Hutt et al., former Chief Counsels of FDA, to The Honorable Judd
Gregg, Chairman of the Health, Education, Labor & Pensions Comm., U.S. Senate) ("If every state
judge and jury could fashion their own labeling requirements for drugs and medical devices, there would
be regulatory chaos for these two industries that are so vital to the public health, and FDA's ability to
advance the public health by allocating scarce space in product labeling to the most important
information would be seriously eroded.").
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"overwam"),' 0 3 which can diminish the effectiveness of FDA-mandated warnings
and deter use of beneficial treatments.1°4
Courts have agreed that certain state requirements pose obstacles to the
accomplishment of the federal government's food and drug regulatory
objectives.' 0 5 Indeed, in 2001, the Supreme Court invalidated state "fraud-on-the-
FDA" claims on the grounds that they posed just such an obstacle in Buckman Co.
v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee.10 6 Echoing most of the major obstacle preemption
themes from Hines, the Buckman Court noted that the subject of the case was
"federal in character,"'1 7 that it involved a comprehensive federal scheme, 10 8 and
103. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935 ("[T]he threat of significant damage awards ...creates
pressure on manufacturers to attempt to add warnings that FDA has neither approved nor found to be
scientifically required."); Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,083
(Dec. 22, 2000) ("[T]he use of labeling in product liability and medical malpractice lawsuits, together
with increasing litigation costs, has caused manufacturers to become more cautious and include virtually
all known adverse event information, regardless of its importance or its plausible relationship to the
drug."); Letter Brief from Peter D. Keisler et al. at 26, Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d 163 (3d Cir.
2004) (No. 02-4597), 2004 WL 1143720 (noting in the device context that the threat of tort litigation
can cause inappropriate warnings or unnecessary withdrawals of FDA-approved products).
104. See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and
Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935 ("'[D]efensive labeling' . .. could result in scientifically
unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization of beneficial treatments."); Labeling and Prescription
Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg.
37,434, 37,447 (June 26, 1979) ("[I]ncluding theoretical hazards as contraindications in drug labeling
would cause that very important section of the labeling to lose its significance."); id. at 37,448 ("[T]o
ensure the significance of boxed warnings in drug labeling, they are permitted in labeling only when
specifically required by FDA."); CTR. FOR DEVICES & RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., WRITE IT RIGHT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR DEVELOPING USER INSTRUCTION MANUALS FOR
MEDICAL DEVICES USED IN HOME HEALTH CARE 7 (1993) ("Overwaming has the effect of not warning
at all. The reader stops paying attention to excess warnings."); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality,
Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 625, 665-66 (1996)
("Excessive warnings are not innocuous.... [l]f warnings are included for inconsequential risks, they
will serve to further dilute the warnings for the real hazards that should be identified to consumers.").
105. See Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 348-53 (2001) (finding
preemption of state fraud-on-the-FDA tort on the grounds that it conflicted with FDA's authority to
police fraud according to its own "delicate balance of statutory objectives"); Jones v. Rath Packing Co.,
430 U.S. 519, 540-43 (1977) (finding a California flour packaging statute preempted on the grounds
that, by permitting variations from the stated weight, it posed an obstacle to a federal statute that aimed
at facilitating comparisons among products ); Cosmetic, Toiletry & Fragrance Ass'n v. Minnesota, 440
F. Supp. 1216, 1224 (D. Minn. 1977), affid, 575 F.2d 1256 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that a Minnesota
cosmetic labeling requirement was "an obstacle to full effectuation of the federal purpose," even though
it was possible to comply with both requirements, because the state scheme "would require more time
and expense and thus cause more disruption"); Dowhal v. SmithKline Beecham Consumer Healthcare,
88 P.3d 1, 15 (Cal. 2004) (finding preemption of California's warning because the state's policy goal
conflicts with FDA's "nuanced goal-to inform pregnant women of the risks of [nicotine replacement
therapy] products, but in a way that will not lead some women, overly concerned about those risks, to
continue smoking").
106. Buckman, 531 U.S. at 347-50.
107. Id. at 347.
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that Congress had assigned FDA "difficult (and often competing) objectives."' 0 9
Moreover, the Court observed that FDA's device regulations require the agency to
"achieve a somewhat delicate balance of statutory objectives," which could be
"skewed" by allowing state tort claims." 10 The prospect of state tort liability would
"dramatically increase the burdens facing potential applicants,"" 1 and it would
provide "an incentive to submit a deluge of information that [FDA] neither wants
nor needs, resulting in additional burdens on the FDA's evaluation of an
application."' 12
In Buckman, the Supreme Court deemed one of FDA's regulatory review
processes-in fact, its device clearance process, the complexity of which pales in
comparison to the agency's review and approval of new drugs-to be sufficiently
comprehensive and complex, and to require a "delicate" enough balancing of
competing considerations, to warrant protection from interference from state tort
requirements under the doctrine of obstacle preemption. How the same court came
to the opposite conclusion about the agency's drug labeling review is an intriguing
question.
B. The Majority's Reasoning
1. Congressional Intent
The Levine majority first rejected obstacle preemption because it found no
evidence in the seventy-year history of the FDCA that Congress viewed state law
suits as an obstacle to the objectives of the statute. H3 Among other considerations,
the majority observed that "despite its 1976 enactment of an express pre-emption
provision for medical devices, Congress has not enacted such a provision for
prescription drugs." ' 1 4 The majority took congressional "silence" on the issue to be
"powerful evidence" that the legislature did not intend FDA labeling decisions to
preempt state law."' There are at least three problems with this argument.
First, the Court reads too much into the existence of an express preemption
provision for medical devices. That provision must be understood within the larger
history of medical device regulation, which contrasts in crucial respects with the
history of new drug regulation. Unlike drugs, medical devices were largely
108. Id. at 348.
109. Id. at 349.
110. Id. at 348.
111. Id. at 350.
112. Id. at 351.
113. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1200 (2009).
114. Id. (citations omitted).
115. Id.
[VOL. 13:225
THOUGHTS ON PREEMPTION IN THE WAKE OF LEVINE
unregulated" 6 at the federal level before 1976, when injuries associated with the
Dalkon Shield intrauterine contraceptive device provided the impetus for passage
of the Medical Device Amendments (MDA)." 7 The MDA gave FDA the authority
to require premarket approval of high-risk devices and enhanced enforcement
authorities with respect to devices.118 Congress included an express preemption
provision in the MDA specifically because-in the absence of any federal
regulation of medical devices-states had already begun legislating in response to
the Dalkon Shield crisis, resulting in thirteen separate device regulation statutes by
1976.119 The Supreme Court recognized this history in Riegel v. Medtronic,120 when
it concluded that the express preemption provision reaches state common law as
well as state regulatory law. 12' There was never a comparable moment in the
history of state and federal new drug regulation. Although some states and local
jurisdictions had enacted rudimentary food and drug laws before 1906,122 the
Congress that enacted the FDCA in 1938 following the elixir sulfanilamide disaster
did not have to contend with a patchwork of state laws comparable to the
patchwork that concerned Congress in 1976. In light of this history, the majority's
116. Medical devices were subject to misbranding and adulteration proscriptions, but not premarket
testing requirements, under the 1938 statute. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717,
§§ 301(b), 501, 502, 52 Stat. 1040, 1042, 1049-51 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 331,
351, 352 (2006 & Supp. 2009)). On more than one occasion, the lack of a comprehensive scheme for
oversight of devices led FDA to classify as a drug something that today would be considered a medical
device. See, e.g., United States v. An Article of Drug . .. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 799 (1969)
(finding it reasonable for the Secretary to deem an antibiotic sensitivity disc a "drug" thus subject to
premarket clearance requirement).
117. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295, 90 Stat. 539; see also Robert S.
Adler & Richard A. Mann, Preemption and Medical Devices: The Courts Run Amok, 59 MO. L. REV.
895, 912 n.84 (1994) ("The Dalkon Shield was cited numerous times during the debates on the MDA in
both the House and Senate.").
118. Medical Device Amendments of 1976, sec. 2, §§ 513-521, 90 Stat. at 540-74 (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c-360k).
119. Robert B. Leflar & Robert S. Adler, The Preemption Pentad: Federal Preemption of Products
Liability Claims After Medtronic, 64 TENN. L. REV. 691, 703 & n.66 (1997). The House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce cited this patchwork of state regulation and concern about burdening
interstate commerce as the reason for the express preemption provision. H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 45
(1976). Although the drafters of the report recognized that some state regulation would be a useful
supplement to the federal program, they noted a desire to avoid overlapping and conflicting regulations
that would burden the device industry unnecessarily. Id. at 45-46. Concern for small manufacturers in
the medical device industry, in the face of conflicting state laws, may have been a complementary
motivation for the express preemption provision. According to one study, small manufacturers (defined
as those suppliers selling less than $1 million worth of merchandise per year to hospitals) made up
91.5% of the market in the early 1970s. Medical Device Amendments, 1973: Hearing on S. 2368, S.
1446, and S. 1337 Before the Subcomm. on Health of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93rd
Cong. 472-73 (1973) (statement of the Health Industries Association).
120. Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312 (2008).
121. Id. at 324-25.
122. See generally PETER BARTON HUrT ET AL., FOOD AND DRUG LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 8
(3d ed. 2007) (noting establishment of city, county, and state boards of health prior to the 1938 statute,
as well as District food and drug legislation from the 1880s).
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emphasis on the existence of an express preemption for medical devices and
Congress' failure to make the preemption provision more generally applicable is
misplaced. Both facts can be explained without inferring anything about
congressional intent with respect to the force of drug provisions enacted earlier.
Second, the Court's previous jurisprudence strongly disfavors drawing
inferences about congressional intent from congressional silence. 23 It is especially
peculiar to infer from the lack of an express preemption provision that there could
be no conflict preemption. It is precisely under those circumstances-when there is
no applicable express preemption provision-that the question of conflict
preemption arises. 124 Moreover, the Court has made it clear that it is inappropriate
to conclude from the presence of a limited express preemption provision-or a
saving provision, for that matter-that Congress intended to disallow the operation
of conflict preemption principles. 125 Without conflict preemption principles, "state
law could impose legal duties that would conflict directly with federal regulatory
mandates ...., Such an interpretation of a federal statute would effectively
123. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1216-17 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("The fact that
the Court reaches the proper conclusion does not justify its speculation about the reasons for
congressional inaction. In this case, the Court has relied on the perceived congressional policies
underlying inaction to find that state law is not pre-empted. But once the Court shows a willingness to
guess at the intent underlying congressional inaction, the Court could just as easily rely on its own
perceptions regarding congressional inaction to give unduly broad pre-emptive effect to federal law.");
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 121 (1994) ("[C]ongressional silence 'lacks persuasive significance'
.... .(quoting Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990))); Cent. Bank of
Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 185 (1994) ("[Ilt is not plausible to interpret
the statutory silence as tantamount to ... implicit congressional intent ...."); Zuber v. Allen, 396 U.S.
168, 185 (1969) ("Legislative silence is a poor beacon to follow in discerning the proper statutory
route."); Castro v. Chi. Hous. Auth., 360 F.3d 721, 728-29 (7th Cir. 2004) ("[A]II we can deem from
congressional silence on the issue is just that-that Congress was silent on the issue. . . .'[I]nferences
from congressional silence are treacherous; oversights are common in the hurly-burly of congressional
enactment; omissions are not enactments; and even deliberate omissions are often subject to alternative
interpretations .... ' (quoting Alto Dairy v. Veneman, 336 F.3d 560, 566 (7th Cir. 2003))); Am.
Online, Inc. v. United States, 64 Fed. Cl. 571, 578 (2005) ("Silence in the legislative history about a
particular provision ordinarily is not a good guide to statutory interpretation ....").
124. See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 387-88 (2000) ("A failure to provide
for preemption expressly may reflect nothing more than the settled character of implied preemption
doctrine that courts will dependably apply, and in any event, the existence of conflict cognizable under
the Supremacy Clause does not depend on express congressional recognition that federal and state law
may conflict." (citing Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co.,
529 U.S. 861, 884-85 (2000) ("[C]onflict pre-emption is different [from express preemption] in that it
turns on the identification of 'actual conflict,' and not on an express statement of pre-emptive intent....
Indeed, one can assume that Congress or an agency ordinarily would not intend to permit a significant
conflict.").
125. Geier, 529 U.S. at 870-71 (rejecting arguments that the presence of a limited express
preemption provision and/or a saving provision affected the operation of "ordinary conflict pre-emption
principles"); Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 287-88 (1995) (repudiating the interpretation
of a previous case to mean that "implied pre-emption cannot exist when Congress has chosen to include
an express pre-emption clause in a statute").
126. Geier, 529 U.S. at 871.
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"permit[] that law to defeat its own objectives, or... to 'destroy itself.' ' 127 Thus,
neither the absence of a preemption provision, nor even the presence of such a
provision that does not happen to apply to the case at hand, grounds any conclusion
about conflict preemption.
Third, it is not correct that Congress has been silent on the issue. This
assertion ignores section 202 of the 1962 amendments to the FDCA. 128 Section 202
was a response to the Supreme Court's field preemption decision six years earlier
in Pennsylvania v. Nelson. 129 In Nelson, the Supreme Court held that, even where
"Congress has not stated specifically whether a federal statute has occupied a field
in which the States are otherwise free to legislate," the federal statute can
nonetheless preempt the entire field. 30 Members of Congress were concerned that
there was no language in the bill that became the 1962 amendments that disavowed
total field preemption.' 3' The member of Congress who introduced the language
that would become section 202 explained that it solved the problem presented by
Nelson because the amendment meant "that this Food and Drug Act shall not be
construed as the intent of Congress to abolish all State laws on the same subject
where they are not in conflict with the Federal law.' ' 132 Section 202 therefore
provides that nothing in the 1962 amendments should "be construed as invalidating
any provision of State law [that] would be valid in the absence of such amendments
unless there is a direct and positive conflict between such amendments and such
provision of State law."' 33 By enacting section 202, Congress both disavowed field
preemption and acknowledged the possibility of conflict preemption.'
3 4
127. Id. at 872 (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring)).
128. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793.
129. 350 U.S. 497, 500-02 (1956).
130. Id. at 501-02.
131. 108 CONG. REc. 21,046 (1962) (statement of Rep. Smith of California).
132. Id. at 21,083 (statement of Rep. Smith of Virginia).
133. Drug Amendments of 1962 § 202 (emphasis added).
134. That Congress intended section 202 to endorse conflict preemption principles is confirmed by
its use of the words "direct and positive" to describe the type of conflict required for preemption to
occur. Id. The Supreme Court had used these same words to describe conflict preemption in Kelly v.
Washington, 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937), which was a leading preemption case when Congress enacted the
1962 legislation. See, e.g., Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 447 (1960)
(discussing Kelly in preemption case); id. at 449 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (same). The Kelly Court held
that Congress may preempt only those state laws that conflict with federal law because "[t]here is no
constitutional rule [that] compels Congress to occupy the whole field." Kelly, 302 U.S. at 10. In stating
that conflict preemption occurs "only where the repugnance or conflict is so 'direct and positive' that the
two acts cannot be reconciled or consistently stand together," the Court used the phrase "direct and
positive" to distinguish the more limited effects of conflict preemption from the sweeping effects of
field preemption. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Section 202 embodied this same distinction.
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2. No Deference Due
The majority also rejected obstacle preemption on the ground that no
deference was due to FDA's conclusion-as expressed in the Federal Register
preamble to new physician labeling regulations in 2006135-that certain state law
failure-to-warn claims threaten the agency's role as the federal agency responsible
for evaluating and regulating drugs. The agency's view "does not merit deference,"
the majority wrote, because (1) there was a "procedural failure" in the physician
labeling rulemaking in that interested parties lacked an opportunity to comment on
the issue; (2) it conflicted with congressional intent; and (3) it reversed the
agency's longstanding contrary position. 136 As discussed in the prior section, the
evidence on congressional intent is more supportive of obstacle preemption than
the majority's opinion allows. The majority's treatment of FDA's view is also
troubling.
The position taken by FDA in the preamble to its final 2006 professional
labeling regulations was not unprecedented; it was in fact consistent with many of
the agency's previous statements. The Department of Justice, on behalf of FDA,
has repeatedly argued for obstacle preemption of specific state law requirements in
cases before the federal courts.137 The agency has also issued regulations
135. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006).
136. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
137. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall, 850 S.W.2d. 155, 159 (Tex. 1993) ("Lilly and the FDA
urge that just such a conflict is presented here: by compelling disclosure of what the regulations promise
will remain confidential, the trial court's order stands as an obstacle to the effective operation of the
FDA's reporting system, and they argue, will effectively destroy it."); Amicus Brief Supporting
Buckman Co., supra note 99, at 10 (arguing that state fraud-on-the-FDA claims "conflict with the
important federal interest in permitting FDA to decide for itself whether it has been defrauded, and, if
so, what sanction is appropriate" and the agency's "decision to grant market clearance" for the
defendant's device); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, Jones v. Rath Packing Co., supra note
23, at 9 (arguing that the California's flour labeling requirements stood as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of federal statutory objectives); Amicus Brief for United States in Support of
Defendant, Motus v. Pfizer, supra note 23, at 1-2 (arguing that failure-to-warn suit based on a proposed
warning that FDA had considered and rejected would "undermine the agency's authority to protect the
public health"); Brief of United States, supra note 100, at 5 (arguing that plaintiffs' request for an
injunction "poses an obstacle to the full objectives of Congress by attempting to substitute [the] Court's
judgment for FDA's scientific expertise"); Amicus Brief of United States in Support of SmithKline,
supra note 23, at 22-23 (arguing that using the proposed warning "would conflict with federal law and
pose an obstacle to accomplishing Congress's full purposes and objectives"); Responsive Memorandum
of United States FDA and USDA, supra note 23, at 23 (arguing that New York's requirement that
nutritious cheese alternatives bear the "imitation" label would "interfere with FDA's goal of
encouraging the development of such products," and thereby "stand[] as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives ... of FDA's regulations") (internal
quotations omitted); Statement of Interest of United States, supra note 99, at 7 (arguing that claims for
injunctive relief in the form of labeling modifications would "frustrate the FDA's ability effectively to
regulate prescription drugs by having the Court substitute its judgment for FDA's scientific expertise").
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preempting specific state law requirements on grounds of obstacle preemption. 38
Although amici have identified a few statements suggesting the contrary, many of
these are compatible with the agency's position in 2006 when they are understood
in context.' 39 Others may, in fact, represent conflicting views from different periods
138. In 1977, FDA preempted state law labeling requirements for over-the-counter (OTC) drugs and
other products in self-pressurized containers propelled by chlorofluorocarbons to promote its "interest in
uniform labeling requirements .... " Certain Fluorocarbon (Chlorofluorocarbon) Propellants in Self-
Pressurized Containers, 42 Fed. Reg. 22,018, 22,026 (Apr. 29, 1977). In 1982, FDA found that state law
labeling requirements for tamper-resistant packaging "would effectively negate" the uniform national
standards that FDA had determined were necessary "throughout the country" to protect the public
health. Tamper-Resistant Packaging Requirements for Certain Over-the-Counter Human Drug and
Cosmetic Products, 47 Fed. Reg. 50,442, 50,448 (Nov. 5, 1982). Again in 1982, FDA determined that "a
single national pregnancy-nursing warning with a specified text is necessary to ensure that OTC drugs
are used safely and for their intended purposes." Pregnant or Nursing Women; Delegations of Authority
and Organization; Amendment of Labeling Requirements for Over-the-Counter Human Drugs, 47 Fed.
Reg. 54,750, 54,756 (Dec. 3, 1982) (citing Over-the-Counter Human Drugs Which Are Generally
Recognized as Safe and Effective and Not Misbranded; Proposed Amendment of General Provisions, 47
Fed. Reg. 39,470, 39,471 (Sept. 7, 1982)). In 1985, FDA proposed a rule that preempted state law
labeling requirements regarding the link between oral aspirin and Reye Syndrome after determining that
a "multiplicity of warning statements" would risk "consumer confusion" and thus interfere with FDA's
"well-established policy of promoting uniformity in the area of labeling." Proposed Labeling for Oral
Aspirin-Containing Drug Products, 50 Fed. Reg. 51,400, 51,402-03 (Dec. 17, 1985); see also Labeling
for Oral and Rectal Over-the-Counter Aspirin and Aspirin-Containing Drug Products, 51 Fed. Reg.
8180, 8180 (Mar. 7, 1986) (final rule). In 1994, FDA proposed a rule that preempted state law
requirements for the disclosure of adverse event-related information treated as confidential under agency
regulations in order to prevent "interfere[nce] with the agency's objective of ensuring the safety of
human drugs, biologics, and devices." Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and
Patients; Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3944 (Jan. 27, 1994); see also Protecting
the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients; Preemption of Disclosure Rules, 60 Fed.
Reg. 16,962, 16,962 (Apr. 3, 1995) (final rule). Finally, in 1997, FDA proposed to preempt state
requirements for the format and content of OTC drug labeling based on concerns that they "would
interfere" with the agency's objective of "uniformity." Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Proposed
Labeling Requirements, 62 Fed. Reg. 9024, 9040 (Feb. 27, 1997). The passage of a federal statute
mandating uniform requirements for OTC drugs subsequent to the publication of this proposal
"supersede[d] the agency's proposed regulation preempting State and local labeling requirements."
Over-the-Counter Human Drugs; Labeling Requirements, 64 Fed. Reg. 13,254, 13,272 (Mar. 17, 1999)
(final rule).
139. For example, former Commissioners Kennedy and Kessler summarize a 1979 preamble as
stating that "FDA labeling decisions do not 'influence civil tort liability of the manufacturer ... ' Brief
of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners Dr. Donald Kennedy and Dr. David A. Kessler in Support
of Respondent at 10 n.4, Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249) [hereinafter Brief of
Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners] (quoting Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising;
Content and Format for Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,447 (June 26,
1979)). But the Commissioners truncated the sentence, which actually states that "[it is not the intent of
FDA to influence the civil tort liability of the manufacturer." Labeling and Prescription Drug
Advertising, 44 Fed. Reg. at 37,437 (emphasis added). The context makes clear that the agency was
assuring a physician commentator that its labeling review process was not designed to influence how
liability would be allocated between doctors and drug companies in product liability or medical
malpractice suits. See id. FDA's intent was simply "to ensure that a complete and accurate explanation
of the drug is provided to the medical community." Id. This response has no implications for FDA's
views on whether its regulations preempt conflicting state requirements. See id. (replying to comments
about tort liability but not discussing preemption). To give another example, the same brief points to the
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in the agency's history. But these statements do not establish a settled position,
nevermind a "traditional" view, 140 especially in light of explicit evidence to the
contrary. It is therefore a mistake to characterize the agency's statements in 2006 as
a departure from its previous views.
The agency's comments in 2006 must be understood within the context in
which they arose. The 2006 preamble was the culmination of a multi-year effort to
modernize agency regulations governing the content and format of physician
labeling,1 4 1 specifically to enhance the safe and effective use of prescription drugs
by creating a package insert that "make[s] it easier for health care practitioners to
access, read, and use information in prescription drug labeling."'' 42 Among other
things, this effort led to the creation of a new Highlights section for physician
labeling, which includes important introductory information on no more than half a
preamble to a proposed rule from 1994 in which FDA made the general statement that FDA
"recogniz[es] that 'product liability plays an important role in consumer protection ....' Brief of
Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners, supra, at 10 n.4 (quoting Protecting the Identities of
Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients, 59 Fed. Reg. at 3948). Though cited as contradictory, this
excerpt is compatible with FDA's position in the 2006 preamble, which indicated that the agency's
approval of prescription drug labeling should "preempt[] state law only to the extent required to preserve
Federal interests," and that it seeks to limit preemption "to the 'minimum level necessary to achieve the
objectives of the [FDCA] .... .' Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3969 (quoting Exec. Order No. 13132, 64
Fed. Reg. 43,255, 43,257 (Aug. 10, 1999)).
140. See Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1202 (claiming that "FDA traditionally regarded state law as a
complementary form of drug regulation").
141. The agency issued a new content and format proposal in December 2000. Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and Biologics; Requirements for
Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082 (Dec. 22, 2000). Before issuing this new
proposal, "the agency evaluated the usefulness of prescription drug labeling" under its existing
regulations, using "focus groups, a national physician survey, a public meeting, and (a] written
comment[]" process. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922. The agency developed a prototype for new labeling,
issued a proposal with that prototype for public comment, and then spent five years reviewing the
comments and finalizing the new requirements. Id. This was part of "a broad effort to improve the
communication to health care practitioners of information necessary for the safe and effective use of
prescription drug[]" labeling. Id. at 3928; see also Jacobson & Feigal, supra note 60 (describing FDA's
2006 labeling revisions as the "culmination of over ten years of study").
142. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3922. Package inserts for new drugs had increased considerably in detail,
complexity and length. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. & INST. FOR SAFE MEDICATION PRACTICES, AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE IMPROVED FDA PRESCRIPTION DRUG LABELING 7 (2006), available at
http://www.ismp.org/fda/ImprovedFDAPrescriptionDrugLabeling.pdf (noting that over time, drug
labeling changed in length, detail, and complexity); Lars Noah, Medicine's Epistemology: Mapping the
Haphazard Diffusion of Knowledge in the Biomedical Community, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 373, 440 (2002)
(discussing the increase in detail of package inserts, and noting that the intent of the FDA rulemaking
was to make prescription drug labeling a better source of information for physicians); Raymond L.
Woosley, Drug Labeling Revisions--Guaranteed to Fail?, 284 JAMA 3047, 3048 (2000) (noting that
package inserts for new drugs "have increased in length more than [five]-fold" and that FDA has
surveyed physicians about optimal labeling because of concerns about the effectiveness of the insert
packaging).
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page unless FDA grants a waiver. 143 The Highlights section is intended to be a brief
summary of key safety and effectiveness information. 144 It draws attention to the
information that health care practitioners most commonly reference and consider
most important, and it guides them to related sections in the Full Prescribing
Information.145 FDA also reordered and reorganized the Full Prescribing
Information, creating a hierarchical structure to give greater prominence to the most
commonly referenced information and to minimize redundancy.
146
Given that FDA was engaged in rulemaking focused on enhancing the role
and function of professional labeling, it seems unremarkable that the agency
became more focused on obstacle preemption (i.e., on the possibility that state law
requirements might frustrate the objectives of the federal labeling scheme). In fact,
the agency received several comments expressing concern about the product
liability implications of the new Highlights requirement; these comments
compelled the agency to consider the issue. 147 Therefore, in the preamble to the
143. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a) (2009); see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3930 (noting FDA's proposal to
require a Highlights section and comments received on that subject).
144. Specific rules govern the content and format of the Highlights section. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a).
With respect to warnings and precautions, for example, it identifies only the most clinically significant
risks and concisely summarizes the salient features of those risks. Id. § 201.57(a)(10); Requirements on
Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at
3939. The Table of Contents for the Full Prescribing Information serves as a navigational tool that
references all sections and subsections in the Full Prescribing Information, some of which are not
referenced in the Highlights. § 201.57(b); see also Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for
Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3941 (stating FDA's intent to require
an Index and Highlights sections and the comments on this proposal).
145. CTRS. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & RESEARCH & BIOLOGICS EVALUATION & RESEARCH, U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: LABELING FOR HUMAN PRESCRIPTION DRUG AND
BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS-IMPLEMENTING THE NEW CONTENT AND FORMAT REQUIREMENTS 7 (2006)
[hereinafter LABELING GUIDANCE], available at http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/98fr/05d-0011-
gdl000I.pdf. The Full Prescribing Information is the most substantive portion of the package insert,
containing all information FDA found necessary for the safe and effective use of the drug. Requirements
on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg.
at 3927.
146. Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Announces New Prescription Drug Information
Format to Improve Patient Safety (Jan. 18, 2006), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/2006/ucm108579.htm. For example, as a result of feedback from two
national physician surveys, the Indications and Usage and the Dosage and Administration sections were
moved to the beginning of the Full Prescribing Information, while Warnings and Precautions were
consolidated into a single section, and Drug Interactions and Use in Specific Populations appear now as
distinct sections. Id.; LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 3-4. In addition, some formerly optional
sections (such as Clinical Studies) are now required. LABELING GUIDANCE, supra note 145, at 3.
147. Several commenters inquired whether the Highlights requirement might make manufacturers
more vulnerable to product liability claims for failure to warn because this section of the labeling
includes only limited safety information. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human
Prescription Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3933. The agency also received comments
that the new requirements might have product liability implications for drugs approved prior to June 30,
2001, because these drugs were not subject to the Highlights requirement. Id. A dramatic increase in
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final rule, FDA restated and elaborated on its belief that certain state law claims
alleging failure to provide adequate warning of a drug's risks are preempted by the
provisions of the FDCA that authorize FDA to approve drug labeling.1
48
Finally, the assertion of procedural deficiency seems a bit odd and unfair,
considering that FDA's preamble was not meant to have the force of law.
Preambles are advisory opinions. 149 Had the agency intended to publish a
preemptive regulation with the force of law, it presumably would have done so. 5°
The agency's statement of its beliefs about the relationship between its decisions
and state law requirements could just as easily have been contained in a brief to the
Court, 15' a Federal Register notice, or another agency publication. There is no legal
requirement, and no compelling policy reason, to subject statements of this sort to
"notice and comment." As the majority itself noted, the weight to be given an
agency's views on obstacle preemption depends on their "thoroughness,
consistency, and persuasiveness,"' 5 2 not on whether stakeholders have participated
in their development. Failure to engage in notice and comment should not render
the agency's views "inherently suspect.'
153
C. Policy Considerations
Near the conclusion of its opinion, the majority rehearsed a number of claims
made by amici for the respondent, apparently in support of its conclusions that
FDA has historically viewed state tort law as complementary rather than preempted
and that FDA's stated views on obstacle preemption are not, in fact, its authentic
views. 154 Specifically, the majority asserted that (1) FDA has limited resources to
monitor the drugs on the market, (2) manufacturers have superior access to safety
product liability litigation in recent years may also explain the agency's decision to lay out its views
more comprehensively than before. See generally Lisa Girion, State Vioxx Trial Is Set as Drug Suits
Boom, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2006, at Cl (discussing how trials about the drug Vioxx have made the
pharmaceutical industry the nation's top target of product liability suits).
148. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935-96.
149. Bracco Diagnostics, Inc. v. Shalala, 963 F. Supp. 20, 25 (D.D.C. 1997) ("[The] preamble...
constitutes an advisory opinion binding on the agency unless repudiated by the agency .... "); 21 C.F.R.
§ 10.85(d)(1) (defining an advisory opinion as "[a] statement of policy or interpretation made in ...
[a]ny portion of a Federal Register notice other than the text of a proposed or final regulation, e.g ... a
preamble to a proposed or final regulation").
150. See supra note 138. The majority effectively concedes this point. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct.
1187, 1203 (2009) ("[W]e have no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive effect of a specific
agency regulation bearing the force of law.").
151. Indeed, they were also contained in the Solicitor General's brief to the Supreme Court in the
Levine case. See Amicus Brief Supporting Wyeth, supra note 99, at 26-27 (describing the brief as an
elaboration of FDA's views as expressed in the 2006 preamble).
152. Levine, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
153. Contra id. (stating that FDA's views on state law are "inherently suspect" in light of FDA's
failure to offer States or interested parties "notice or opportunity for comment").
154. Id. at 1202-03 & n.12.
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information about marketed drugs, (3) state tort suits uncover unknown drug
hazards, (4) state tort suits provide incentives for manufacturers to disclose safety
risks promptly, and (5) state tort suits serve a distinct compensatory function that
may motivate injured persons to come forward with information.'55
The majority's reliance on these assertions is troubling. As a preliminary
matter, they appear to be immaterial to the question of what FDA believes about
the preemptive effects of its labeling determinations. Beyond that, they are
disputable claims for which little evidence was provided to the Court. We disagree,
for example, that FDA has inadequate resources to monitor the drugs on the
market. Although FDA's general funding level has not kept pace with its statutory
mandate, 156 drug safety is the most generously funded agency function in the
agency's annual government appropriation, 157 and it receives considerable
supplemental funding from user fees paid by the regulated parties. 158 The agency's
Center for Drug Evaluation and Research has almost 3,000 full-time equivalent
employees, approximately one quarter of everyone employed by the agency. 159
The suggestion that state tort suits reveal safety risks known to the
manufacturer but unknown to FDA is puzzling in light of the agency's
comprehensive new drug application, safety update report, postmarket safety
reporting, and annual report requirements. 160 The majority may be implying that
state tort law is somehow necessary to induce non-compliant manufacturers to
comply with FDA's requirements. 16 1 But the reporting requirements are already
backed by criminal and civil enforcement authority, 162 and the agency itself can and
155. Id. at 1202. The majority concluded that "the FDA long maintained that state law offers an
additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that complements FDA regulation." Id. at 1202-
03.
156. See generally Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60
ADMIN. L. REv. 431, 450-52 (2008) (describing the gap that exists between the funds FDA needs and
the amount of funds actually appropriated).
157. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FISCAL YEAR 2010: FOOD AND DRUG
ADMINISTRATION JUSTIFICATION OF ESTIMATES FOR APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEES 17 (2009),
available at http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/
ucm153374.htm (noting that in FY 2010, FDA's human drugs program was slated to receive $458
million from FDA's federal budget appropriation, as compared to $206 million for the biologics
program and $315 million for devices and radiological health).
158. Id. at 86 (noting that in FY 2010, the human drugs program has been projected to receive an
additional $450 million in user's fees).
159. Id. at 265.
160. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.50, .80, .81 (2009) (describing the content and form of drug applications
and the reporting requirements for drug applicants).
161. See Brief of Amici Curiae Former FDA Commissioners, supra note 139, at 11 n.5 ("Many of
the recent failure-to-warn cases ... allege that the drug's manufacturer withheld important safety data
from FDA.").
162. 21 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333 (2006).
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does police compliance.1 63 At its core, the majority's argument seems to be that the
federal scheme cannot accomplish its mission without the help of state tort law. It
strikes us as strange not to allow the federal scheme to operate unhampered by
conflicting state requirements before drawing this debatable conclusion.
D. The Future of Obstacle Preemption
The future for obstacle preemption in pharmaceutical litigation after Levine is
cloudy. The majority gave no deference to FDA's view that its statutory objectives
are frustrated by state tort suits that impose different labeling requirements than its
own. 164 Instead, based on arguments put forward by amici, it posited that state tort
litigation in fact complements the federal regulatory scheme.' 65 The decision did
leave open the possibility of an agency rulemaking with preemptive effect, and
Justice Breyer noted this option in his concurrence. 166 Thus, one clear path forward
would be rulemaking on the preemption question. Apart from this, it is unclear
whether this Court, or a differently composed Court at a later time, could be
persuaded to reconsider the weight due to FDA's views or the proper relationship
between federal drug labeling requirements and state tort law.
The majority's unquestioning acceptance of the far-reaching assertions of
amici for the respondent is very troubling. Not only does the majority's rejection of
obstacle preemption on the basis of these assertions strikes us as incorrect, but it
also strikes us as profoundly bad public policy. FDA is an expert agency entrusted
by Congress with a mandate that involves complex technical judgments and
delicate balancing of the risks and benefits of drug products at a societal level. The
agency's ability to make those determinations and strike those balances is, and will
be, significantly compromised by private lawsuits that allow juries to introduce
163. See Fraud, Untrue Statements of Material Facts, Bribery, and Illegal Gratuities; Final Policy, 56
Fed. Reg. 46,191, 46,192 (Sept. 10, 1991) ("The fraud policy ... ensure[s] ... that ... decisions on
pending applications are made based upon reliable data; ... resources are not wasted[;] ... applications
containing fraudulent data are removed from the review process; . . . [a]pproval of applications
containing fraudulent data is withdrawn; and ... [m]arketed products that may be affected by wrongful
acts do not pose a threat to the public health."); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., APPLICATION INTEGRITY
POLICY PROCEDURES 2 (1998), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ICEClI/EnforcementActions/
ApplicationlntegrityPolicy/UCM072631.pdf (providing the specific procedures for the policy that
"focuses on the integrity of data and information in applications submitted for [FDA] review and
approval").
164. Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1201 (2009).
165. Id. at 1202-03 & nn.12-13.
166. Justice Breyer wrote:
The FDA may seek to determine whether and when state tort law acts as a help or a
hindrance to achieving the safe drug-related medical care that Congress sought. It may seek
to embody those determinations in lawful specific regulations describing, for example, when
labeling requirements serve as a ceiling as well as a floor. And it is possible that such
determinations would have pre-emptive effect. I agree with the Court, however, that such a
regulation is not at issue in this case.
Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
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considerations unrelated to science and the public health into labeling
determinations.
CONCLUSION
There are compelling policy arguments in favor of a state tort scheme that is
not preempted by federal law. Foremost among them is that individuals who have
suffered injuries after taking drugs deemed safe and effective by FDA should
receive compensation for those injuries. We recognize the appeal of this argument,
and we do not challenge the instinct that gives rise to it. Nonetheless, we question
the conclusion that tort suits against pharmaceutical companies are an effective way
to compensate the injured. To the extent that state tort suits permit punitive
damages, of course, they are not meant to serve a compensatory function; the
purpose and appropriateness of punitive damages is a separate question. As a
means of compensating people who have been injured, though, tort litigation has
consistently proven to be expensive, inconsistent, and more rewarding for lawyers
than for the injured. 167
Whether tort litigation is an appropriate mechanism for redressing injuries is a
complex policy question that is well beyond the scope of this Article. Still, we
cannot help but conclude that, if the goal is to compensate the injured, there are
undoubtedly better ways-ways that do not impede the very system that we rely on
to protect us from those injuries. Perhaps it is time for policy makers to consider
alternative compensation systems for injuries arising out of the use of approved
prescription drugs.1
68
167. See Jason C. Miller, Note, When and How to Defer to the FDA: Learning from Michigan's
Regulatory Compliance Defense, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 565, 568-69 (2009) (noting
that private litigation is an expensive, duplicative, and inefficient method of compensating victims and
that it disproportionately rewards attorneys). Tort litigation has also been shown to inhibit drug
development and drive some drugs off the market. See Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product
Liability on New Drug Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON
SAFETY AND INNOVATION 334, 336 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) ("[P]roduct liability
issues prevent needed pharmaceutical research from being carried out and cause drugs with
acknowledged utility to be eliminated from the marketplace."). Furthermore, it provides a particular
disincentive for the development of treatments for high-risk populations, such as pregnant women. See
COMM. ON POPULATION, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL & DIV. OF INT'L HEALTH, INST. OF MED.,
DEVELOPING NEW CONTRACEPTIVES: OBSTACLES AND OPPORTUNITIES 141 (Luigi Mastroianni, Jr. et al.
eds., 1990) ("[P]roducts liability litigation and the impact of that litigation on the cost and availability of
liability insurance have contributed significantly to the climate of disincentives for the development of
contraceptive products."); STEVEN GARBER, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE ECONOMICS OF
PHARMACEUTICALS AND MEDICAL DEVICES 63 (1993) ("[P]roducts for patients with high rates of
unexplained background injuries appear especially hazardous from a legal point of view-birth defects
are the most prominent example.").
168. There are models in states, at the federal level, and in other countries for consideration and
possible adaptation. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-962 (2006 & West Supp. 2009) (Black Lung Benefits
Act); 42 U.S.C. §§ 247d to 247d-6e (authorizing the Secretary to make grants and conduct investigations
into the cause, treatment, or prevention of a public health emergency); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-I to -34
(establishing the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (VIC Program) to provide
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compensation for vaccine-related injury or death); 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (Price-Anderson Indemnity
Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954); Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401-409, 115 Stat. 230, 237-41 (2001) (creating the September 11 th Victim
Compensation Fund); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 199.50 (AIDS Vaccine Victims Compensation
Fund) (repealed 2010); Christopher Hodges, Nordic Compensation Schemes for Drug Injuries, 29 J.
CONSUMER POL'Y 143, 143-47 (2006) (describing voluntary national compensation system for drug-
related injuries that became effective in 1978, as well as similar schemes in Finland, Denmark, and
Norway); Accident Comp. Corp., History of ACC in New Zealand, http://www.acc.co.nz/about-
acc/overview-of-acc/introduction-to-acc/ABA00004 (last visited May 31, 2010) (describing New
Zealand's Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001).
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